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The Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt. Legal Administration by
The Jews under the Early Roman Empire as Described by Philo Judaeus.
By Erwin R. Goodenough. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929. pp.
vii, 268. $3.
One of the most important of all Western communities in the extent and
diversity of its influence, was the great city of Alexandria, founded by
Alexander himself at the mouth of the Nile and for many centuries the
capital of the science, art, literature, wealth, and later the religion of the
Western World. Political and social.institutions created there still deter-
mine our organization, and ideas formulated there still dominate our think-
ing. It will not be difficult, therefore, to believe that the law of such a com-
munity in all.its aspects and elements is of first rate importance.
That law we have recently been enabled to examine in the way in which
lawyers are particularly glad to do it-by the study of the constantly
increasing mass of concrete examples of its application. First hand ma-
terial is daily being disentangled from rubbish heaps and deciphered by
papyrologists, and the systematization and analysis of these materials has
recreated a life which we hitherto have known imperfectly and in-
accurately from the fragments of Alexandrian literature. It has further
enabled us to observe the Roman law in its living operation on a mass which
resisted and modified it and was partially absorbed by it; in all probability
it will be through the East-Mediterranean law as it developed in Alexan-
dria that we shall ultimately gain anything like a full understanding of
:Roman law.
A special phase of Alexandrian law was the law of the Jewish commun-
ity in that city-a community which was so exceptional in its relation to the
city itself as to be very nearly unique. It was apparently autonomous--we
shall probably be safe in describing it as quasi-autonomous. At any rate,
if the Jews rightfully there had what was called Alexandrine citizenship,
they had it in a way somewhat different from other groups who were also
denominated Alexandrines, and their citizenship was especially different
from that of Greek Alexandrines.
That the Jews had courts of their own is highly likely, and that in those
courts they administered a law which was ex professo a Jewish law is to be
assumed and is almost demonstrable from the scanty references in the
Talmud. But the large increase of material afforded by the papyri has
given substance and color to what was before a vague outline. Many
doubts are still unresolved and many questions still unanswered, but we
may now speak with some assurance on points about which we could for-
merly scarcely guess, and the need of combining with this material an in-
tensive study of the literary sources has become urgent.
It is for that reason that an investigation such as that undertaken by
Professor Goodenough deserves cordial welcome. Philo the Jew was a
notable member of the Alexandrian community and has become still more
important for posterity by the fact that so much of his work has survived.
As he was particularly interested in justifying to a sophisticated Greek and
Roman society Jewish institutions, in which legal elements were indissolubly
associated with morality, ritual, religion and philosophy, we should expect
1222
1930 BOOK REVIEWS 1223
to find a rich background from which we might gain valuable, if frag-
mentary, material for a study of contemporary law.
Professor Goodenough goes still further. He thinks that Philo consciously
presents to us the specific legal system actually in operation in the courts
of the Jewish politeunw, the state within the Alexandrian state, and that
this is so particularly in one of Philo's books generally kmovn as De Spe-
cialibus Legibus I-IV, which is apparently a commentary on the Decalogue
and a defense of the Mosaic legislation. He finds the demonstration of his
thesis in noting how in these works of Philo, the traditional Jewish law, as
laid down in the Pentateuch, has yielded to the fact that it was being ap-
plied in a community Greek in speech and culture and ruled by a Roman
viceroy.
It is an interesting and defensible theory, but we can hardly call it
demonstrated. There is nothing in the facts of Philo's life to indicate that
he had ever exercised any magisterial function in the community or had
himself taken part in judicial determinations. But more than this negative
fact, there are several suggestions that he had in mind an ideal system of
which the Mosaic legislation was both the source and the model. Where
he departs from the traditional exegesis of the Pentateuch, it is in the in-
terests of a philosophic idealism. He speaks as a legislator with his "Let
this be done," or "This should be the case," but he is legislating for a
cosmopolis, not setting forth the law of Alexandria.
This is the theory generally held by students of Philo, and it is certainly
supported by such statements as De Specialibus Legibzs II, 73, and, we
may say, by the subject matter of the entire first book De Specialibus Legi-
bus. Professor Goodenough sets himself vigorously to combat the accepted
view but I cannot find that he does so with success. It is obvious, however,
that even if Philo was merely constructing a philosophic Utopia grounded
on the Pentateuch, his words and his concrete illustrations would necez-
sarily be of his own time and place, and, even without specific magisterial
experience, an educated man in an ancient community would have a certain
familiarity with law. By a cautious weighing of this material we may gain
a great deal and Professor Goodenough's examination of the De Specialibus
Legibus would be amply justified if it dealt merely with these implied and
almost covert allusions.
To do the work thoroughly demands legal competence, as Professor Good-
enough is aware, and he modestly deplores his deficienciLs. "Any maid in
Pilate's court," he says (p. 5) "will recognize in my speech the crude accent
of Galilee." The maid, by the bye, was of the High-Priest's household, not
in Pilate's court, and the little lapse here noted is not without significance.
Professor Goodenough insists on relying on his memory and his memory
is treacherous, as the memories of learned men are apt enough to be, some-
times in direct proportion to their learning. At any rate the lapses in this
book are sufficiently numerous to suggest that the author has imposed on
himself something less than the Roman exacta diligentia in finding author-
ity for his statements.
So, for example, he seems to believe that the strategus of the Egyptian
administration was the Roman executive (pp. 20, 34, 37), and he draws
inferences from that fact. But the Roman executive in Egypt was the pre-
fect-in Greek, hegeinon-and the strategs was a subordinate official,
generally a Greek or a Grecized Egyptian who continued the title and the
functions of the Ptolemaic organization. He refers to a prohibition by
Tiberius, "in 11 A. D.," against "recourse to magicians whether privately
or in the presence of witnesses." (p. 38) The date was 16 A. D. and the
passage of Suetonius (Tib. 63) to which he refers (n. 29) speaks only of
haruspices and forbids only secret consultation. Heinemann does not say
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that the "Attic drachma was worth four times the shekel" (p. 45), but
quotes Josephus as saying that the shekel was worth four Attic drachmas
(Ant. III, § 194), a statement amply supported by extant coins. Again
there is nothing in the passage which the author quotes (De Sp. Leg. II,
123, quoted p. 52, n. 80) which justifies the assertion that Philo regarded
Gentile slaves as "truly slaves."
Dr. Goodenough assumes the Alexandrian Greeks would have been ignor-
ant of an asylum which was anything more than an altar (p. 41). But the
right of cities and entire islands to be asylums was just at that very time
a burning question at Rome (Tacitus Ann. II, 60 et seq.), and the general
notion of asylum included the whole sacred enclosure, the ternenos. Simi-
larly he mistakes the character of the asylum used by fugitive slaves (p.
54). It was not "a sacred statue" (p. 54, n. 90) but specifically the em-
peror's statues. The practice of fleeing to such statues had apparently
begun at about this time but it secured little for the slave except a certain
public reprobation of the master. It was not till the time of Antonius
Pius (Gaius 1, 53) that on proof of cruelty a slave who had thus sought
refuge could legally demand to be sold to another master, just as Philo
proposes. What the author means by "Ulpian's legislation" in this connec-
tion (p. 54) is hard to make out.
Again, when Dr. Goodenough says (p. 56) that "classic Greek law gave
the eldest son a double portion of the inheritance," he is contradicted by the
references in his own note (n. 99). Nothing is better known than that the
usual Greek rule was equal sharing among sons and exclusion of daughters,
Crete being a striking exception in the second respect but not in the first.
As far as Jewish law is concerned, while Deuteronomy 21, 7, apparently has
a special case in mind, it is none the less a fact that it was early generalized
and the general rule is taken as axiomatic in the Talmud. Philo. as the
author correctly notes, is inconsistent in his defense of the practice, a phe-
nomenon not unknown in commentators on sacred texts.
The dinzoiria-not dimeirion, as Dr. Goodenough has it (p. 57)-of Ptole-
maic law was, according to Kreller (ERBR. UNTERSUCHUNGEN, pp. 153 et
seq., quoted p. 57, n. 100), this same double portion. Kreller's examples fall
somewhat short of proof of this fact and if Professor Harmon, as the au-
thor declares (ibid.), is about to publish a more complete demonstration, it
will be very welcome. But it is likely to be a development deriving from
Pharaonic Egypt and Philo's rule is easily to be assigned to the accepted
Jewish understanding of the passage in Deuteronomy.
Dr. Goodenough's conception of marital property at Athens is hard to
understand. A woman's "possessions" did not "belong to her husband" (p.
58). She had no possessions except her dowry and of that the husband
had only a usufruct. And on the next page, Heinemann is declared to have
"recognized that this treatment of a girl by her brothers is quite in ac-
cordance with Greek custom." But Heinemann says on the contrary that
Philo's grant of a part of the inheritance to women went beyond Greek law
and points out that in other respects Philo is giving all daughters the pe-
culiar status of an Attic epikleros.
In regard to Roman law, also, Professor Goodenough has, it is to be
feared, not examined his statements closely enough. He cites the Lex
Cornelia as authority for the penalty for false witness but the passages
he mentions (p. 179, n. 92) refer to the forging of wills. It is hardly worth
while speculating on the "Greek source" for "Ulpian's law" (p. 181), when
Ulpian specifically says, as Professor Goodenough's quotation itself shows,
that he is citing a rescript of Serverus and Caracalla. When the author
refers to the Digest to prove that by the Lex Fabia kidnapping of free
men was a capital crime (p. 156, n. 38), he is doubtless not aware that, as
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the same Digest title shows (D. 48, 15, 7), it did not become so till the
third or fourth century and in Philo's time it merely involved a money fine.
We happen to have the exact words of the Lex Fabia preserved in the
Collatio, XIV, 2 and 3.
Finally we may note that the author's frequent references to "lynching"
somewhat miss the point of the incidents on which he bases his assertions.
That Philo would have watched the lynching of an apostate with perfect
equanimity is likely enough. His zealous outburst (p. 33) has, as Dr.
Goodenough correctly says, all the color and ring of this peculiar type of
fanaticism. But it was not an uncommon element of many legal systems,
ancient and modern, that certain penalties were assigned to popular execu-
tion. It was involved in every declaration of outlawry, sacer esto, and we
may recall specifically the Athenian statute by which every citizen swore
to kill a traitor with his own hand if need be (Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 127-
131, Andocides, De Myst. § 95). That is to say lynching is "wild" justice
and this sort of thing is "folk" justice, perfectly legitimate, since it is a
part of the regularly established sanctions.
We may say then that Professor Goodenough has not taken his responsi-
bilities in these matters quite as seriously as they deserved. The subject
matter of his book is highly important and interesting to legal historians
and it is to be hoped that he will continue to dig in this scarcely used
quarry, and to apply to his results a slightly severer censorship.
Berkeley, Cal. MAX RAnxN.
Year Books of Richard II: 13 Richard Ir (1389-1390). Edited by Theodore
F. T. Plucknett. London, Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co., Ltd., 1929.
pp. xlix, 205.
When the black letter year books were being printed in the sixteenth
century, for some reason those of the reign of Richard II were passed over.
Again in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the editors of the
Rolls Series and of the Selden Society turned their attention to the year
books, they chose to do their work in periods much earlier than that of
Richard II. Until 1914, therefore, there was no year book from that reign
in print. In that year the Ames Foundation brought out the year book
for 12 Richard II. Professor Plucknett's book is the second volume in what
may now be regarded as a definite undertaking to fill a real gap in the list
of printed year books.
In regard to external features and matters of arrangement generally,
the editor very sensibly has followed the example set by the Selden Society
year books. In the matter of handling the text, however, there is a notice-
able divergence. Instead of the usual composite text made up from a
number of manuscripts, Professor Plucknett has preferred to give for each
of his cases the actual reading of a single manuscript, and to indicate the
variations of other manuscripts by footnote variants. In translating the
cases into English, use is made of the whole apparatus.
In another particular, and one for which the editor is in no way respon-
sible, this newest of our printed year books differs markedly from thoso
of an earlier period which have been re-edited within the present genera-
tion. That is a difference in content. The irrelevancies so common in the
year, books of the first two Edwards are lacking. The reporters of the
earlier reigns found time to report much, that was in lighter mood and
vein, personalities and non-legal observations. From materials of this
sort in the year books of Edward the Second's time Mr. Bolland was able
to paint an interesting and lively picture of Sir William Bereford, chief
justice of the court of common pleas. Professor Plucknett would doubtless
find it hard to paint a similar picture of any one of the judges of the time
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of Richard II were he to depend upon these later year books for his in-
formation. In the interval the reporter has conie to be concerned only
with things legal. When the year books first appeared the lay lawyer was
a newcomer in English society. He had everything, or nearly everything,
to learn even in the technicalities of his own profession. In connection
with the early reports, at many places and on many points, one must be
prepared, as Maitland said, "to read elementary lectures on general juris-
prudence to the acutest lawyers of the age." Such a criticism would
hardly apply to the legal profession as we see it in Professor Plucknett's
pages. We may not be justified in inferring that what was said and done
by lawyers in the courts at the end of the fourteenth century differed
materially from what was said and done a hundred years earlier, but the
reports certainly suggest it. There is in them a seriousness, an almost
complete attention to the business in hand and to nothing else, that is fre-
quently lacking in the older year books. As law reports strictly speaking,
they are doubtless of a somewhat higher type than their early predecessors;
as historical documents in a larger sense they are hardly as interesting
or as illustrative of life in general.
For illustrative material, as often for the facts of i case and usually
for the judgment, we are forced to go to what has now very rightly come
to be regarded as the complement of the year book, the plea rolls of the
same period. In many, if not most instances, the discrepancies and omis-
sions of the year book report make the printing of the record in the plea
roll necessary for a real understanding of the case. Professor Plucknett,
following the example set by Pike and adopted by the editors of the Selden
Society year books, has supplemented the report with the plea roll when-
evet possible. In fact, not the least arduous part of his task nor the
least -valuable part of his book is represented by the large amount of
authoritative matter from the rolls which he has given us.
To show the relation of year book to plea roll, and to illustrate the greater
definiteness and detail of the latter, Onyng v. Morys (pp. 153-158) may be
used as an example. The year book report of this case is useful as bear-
ing on a point of law which as stated in the head note is: "In trespass for
entering a house, where the plaintiff alleges that he is in by lease from
the defendant but does not produce a deed, the defendant can allege that
the lease was conditional and that he entered for breach of the condition,
also without producing a deed." The account in the plea roll is of value
not only to the legal historian, but constitutes also source material of the
finest kind for the social and economic history of the times--and also of
its morals. In it the facts are discussed with such candor and lack of
reserve that one is almost led to wonder why it has not come under the
ban of the self constituted censors who decree what shall circulate as read-
able matter in Cambridge. Briefly the facts are that the bishop of London
had leased to plaintiff for forty years at an annual rental of 13/4 a house
in St. Paul's cemetery, with the condition that the house should be used only
for respectable callings and by respectable persons. The successor of the
lessor ejected the plaintiff on the ground that the premises were being
used for immoral purposes. A barber, a smith, a fishmonger, a porter, a
chaplain and seven other men took part in the raid, and, if we may believe
the story of the lessee, who brought an action of trespass against them,
carried off his goods and chattels to the value of forty pounds. In addi-
tion to the plaintiff four women were occupying the house--communes
meretrices the bishop called them, women of unblemished character the
lessee insisted. The complainant claimed that raiders carried off "22
marks, 2s. 3d. in a purse, 260 'perles' (beads), a piece of gold plate, a filet
of 'perles' (a beaded head band), a pair of Paternosters in amber (a com-
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plete chaplet), a fur of black budge, a hood of scarlet, 4 ells of cloth, an
'erpikle' (an ornamental comb) of silver gilt, cloths of silk and linen, a
shirt, 95 precious stones called 'doublettes de Garnades' (counterfeit jewels
of garnets and glass), a silver spoon, 4 pleats of Grymyle, a roll with 7
psalms (the seven 'penitential' psalms--conscience also must have its
solace), cloths of linen and wool." Apparently a variety of cheap orna-
ment and imitation jewelry was not unknown in fourteenth century Eng-
land; seemingly also there was at least an approximation of correctness
in the bishop's surmise.
In his introduction Professor Plucknett has commented on a number of
cases marked by either peculiarities of fact or of legal interest. Such com-
ment, fortunately for readers in general, has now come to be regarded
as part of the equipment of a properly edited year book. So also has an
English translation of the French text. This translation would seem to
be the most thankless part of the labor of editing a year book. Only those
who have themselves struggled with the vagaries of year book French can
appreciate the difficulties, at times almost insurmountable, of turning it
into good English. Some passages simply can not be satisfactorily trans-
lated; in places the meaning can only be guessed; a literal translation is
quite out of the question. We like Professor Plucknett's translation; it
is free enough to be altogether intelligible and easily read; as far as we
can judge from such comparisons as we have made with the original it
lacks the stilted form of that original and yet conveys the same ideas.
It is with no thought of adversely criticizing what we regard as a suc-
cessful piece of work that we take this opportunity of correcting one little
slip which the editor has now twice failed to discover., On page 124,
Hankford's statement that the rule that no man should be impleaded con-
cerning his freehold without the king's writ is regarded as the statement
of a tradition as to the statutory origin of that principle as expressed in
Glanvill, xii, 25. Whatever may have been the origin of the rule, by Hank-
ford's time it was statutory. It is chapter 18 of the Provisions of West-
minster and chapter 22 of the Statute of Marlborough.
James Barr Ames, if he were alive, would doubtless be glad that the
Foundation which bears his name has published this volume, which means
that both the Foundation and Professor Plucknett should feel satisfied
with this Year Book of 13 Richard I.
New Haven, Conn. GEORGE E. WOODBINE.
The T'ansfer of Stock. By Francis T. Christy. New York, Baker, Voorhis
& Co., 1929. pp. xxi, 1071. Supplement, pp. 34. $15.
In 1884 President Lowell and his cousin and former law partner, Francis
Cabot Lowell, prepared an interesting and scholarly volume dealing with
transfers of shares.' Since then colossal business expansion has been ac-
companied by a corresponding increase in the use of the corporation as a
business device. This development has witnessed a startling growth in
the proportionate amount of "share capital" as contrasted with borrowed
funds employed in corporate financing. For this phenomenon two factors
are primarily responsible (there are other contributing causes) : (1) the
evolution of an investor-consciousness that during a period of such business
expansion corporate shares constitute not only a more profitable but also
I See also Plucknett, New Light on the Old County ;',ourt (1929) 42 HARt.
L. REV. 639, 646, n. 26.1LoWEU, AND LOwELL, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK IN PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(1884).
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a safer investment than bonds,2 and (2) the four-fold increase since. 1920
in the proportion of share dividends to cash dividends,8 as a result (at
least in part) of the Supreme Court's decision in that year that share
dividends are not taxable as income.4 Five-million-share days on the New
York Stock Exchange are now almost commonplace and, despite the high
percentage of speculative transactions, stock transfer agents are being
overwhelmed by the increase in recorded transfers. In view of these facts
it is indeed amazing that the volume under review is the first comprehensive
treatise on transfers of shares to have been published in the forty-five
years following President Lowell's work on the subject.
The need for such a book is great, for there is perhaps no corporate
activity which involves so much risk and so little advantage to a corpo-
ration as the recordation of transfers of its shares. Mr. Christy has filled
this need admirably: his work is a clear, complete and unique exposition
of the mechanics of such transfers and of the approved procedure of stock
transfer agents as well as a presentation of the multitudinous legal prob-
lems involved therein. If the volume has any major weakness it is to
be found in its treatment of the legal rather than the "practical" aspects
of the subject. When the author invades the realm of legal theory, he is
seldom effective; the first two chapters, which in large measure attempt
to set forth what a "share" really is and how "it" is created, are quite
inadequate. Moreover, one must regret the infrequency with which the
author has even attempted to bring the light of his experience and ability
at the Bar to bear upon tangled situations resulting from conflicting or
ill-defined legal theories. For example, except for an occasional statement
(usually inaccurate or misleading), Mr. Christy has entirely avoided the
very important and complex problem of the legal consequences of the issu-
ance of certificates in violation of various common types of prohibitions
or regulations found either in statutes or in the articles of association or
the by-laws. Whether such certificates are within or without the province
of a transfer agent would seem to be of the utmost importance.
The book frequently contains a foot-note paragraph of citations for
some vague text statement where the cited cases in fact decide a variety of
disconnected propositions. About twelve hundred separate cases are cited
throughout the volume, over three-quarters of which are referred to more
than once, and a large number of these are mentioned as many as eight
or nine times in scattered references. This plurality of citation indicates
the existence of two defects, which an examination of the treatise con-
firms, namely, that much of the authority invoked is merely dictum, and
that various portions of the text are highly repetitious. Occasionally even
conflicting statements are to be found; for an illustration contrast the
allegation in Section 264, page 467 that "he [a shareholder who has been
refused a transfer] cannot bring a bill to compel transfer and also ask
damages for the refusal to transfer" with the first sentence of Section 271,
page 489, "In a suit in equity to compel a transfer of stock, damages suf-
fered by reason of the refusal to make the transfer are incidental to the
equitable relief, and may properly be demanded in the same action."
Notwithstanding these few blemishes, the book is of enormous value. It
reveals and illumines countless latent problems; it conveniently assembles
a vast quantity of scattered information, particularly with reference to
federal and state legislation, on such topics as sales and distributions by
executors and administrators, inheritance tax waivers and affidavits, trans-
2 VAN STRUM, INVESTING IN PURCHASING POWER.
3 A REPORT oN STocK DrVmENDS, submitted Dec. 5, 1927 by the Federal
Trade Commission in response to Senate Resolution 304.
4 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189 (1920).
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fers by guardians, and stock transfer taxes. About one-third of the 923
pages in the body of the book is devoted to an appendix setting forth cer-
tain legislative enactments, the rules of the New York Stock Transfer
Association, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the rules of the New York
Stock Exchange and of the New York Curb Market as to the delivery of
securities, and various recommended forms.
Transactions for the recordation of a transfer of shares frequently pro-
voke friction and indignation. Much of this turmoil is the result of in-
adequate knowledge, on the part of those desiring transfers, of the legal
and formal difficulties involved. As an avenue of escape from such un-
necessary controversies, this book will be gratefully received, and one
may confidently predict that it will soon be regarded as the bible of stock
transfer agents.
New Haven, Conn. ALExANDER HAbumT0,o FRnc.
Cases and Readings on the Law of Nations. By Edwin De Witt Dickinson.
New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1929. pp. xxii, 1133. $6.
Cases and Other Material-s on International Law. By Manley 0. Hudson.
St. Paul, West Pub. Co., 1929. pp. xxxv, 1538. $G.50.
The almost simultaneous appearance of two new case books on interna-
tional law, edited by such outstanding men as Professors Dickinson and
Hudson, is of more than usual interest and importance to teachers of this
subject because of the fact that they are the first collections to be made
since the World War. The 1922 editions of the selections of Evans and of
Scott were made too early to include the many important developments in
the subject since that time. Russia has given courts, both here and abroad,
much to think and write about, and prohibition has taught us much about
the law of territorial waters, to say nothing of the ordinary run of cases in-
volving international law which may be expected to follow the termination
of any important war. A large number of international tribunals and
commissions have been at work disposing of thousands of claims, and while
the bulk of decisions emanating from them have been of little general im-
portance, they have, nevertheless, made a distinct contribution to the de-
velopment of international law. That the editors have made full use of
this material is evidenced by the large percentage of cases decided since
1918 to be found in both volumes.
Both of these volumes, like Professor Hyde's text, purport to present
the subject "chiefly as it is interpreted and applied by British and Ameri-
can Courts." Neither, however, has entirely ignored continental material-
both volumes containing decisions by continental courts--which is a con-
siderable departure from the practice of previous editors. Another depar-
ture in the form of quotations from authoritative texts is liberally used in
Professor Dickinson's work. These quotations are carried in the text and
are given equal prominence with the cases quoted. A psychological objec-
tion to this occurs which may or may not be important. The average
American law student usually takes up the study of international law
with the notion that there is something fundamentally different between it
and the law with which he is familiar; that international law is probably
not even law at all, but some system of international morality which is
being presented to him under the guise of law. To this average student
no thoughts of the nature and origin of law have ever occurred; to him
law begins and ends in the pronouncements of courts in published cases.
If it is a correct assumption that to the average law student international
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law as a legal subject is suspect, then it would seem that anything which
might tend to lessen the emphasis on international law as law in the same
sense that the law of contracts is law should be avoided. This objection,
of course, would be valid only in so far as the law students are con-
cerned; where the subject is taught in schools of political science it would
probably be advantageous in lessening the feeling of unfamiliarity which
a mere selection of cases would engender in the academic student.
The most radical departure, however, and the one most caledlated to
provoke discussion, is the treatment, or rather lack of treatment, of the
law of war and neutrality. War and neutrality, as such, are entirely
omitted from Professor Dickinson's volume, while Professor Hudson dis-
poses of both in a mere hundred and sixty-eight pages of a fifteen hun-
dred page book. It is to be understood, of course, that much that deals
with the effects of war is to be found in both books in chapters not dealing
with war and neutrality as such. Previous selections of cases have uni-
formly devoted approximately one-half the work to pacific relations of
states and one:half to belligerency and the relations growing out of it.
It is interesting to compare the different reasons assigned by the editors
for the change. Professor Dickinson omits war and neutrality in his volume
because experience has convinced him that an introductory course should
be concerned only with a more intensive study of a few fundamentals,
that the law relating to war and neutrality and other subjects which he
deems governed by "essentially political standards of conduct" should be
left for advanced courses. On the other hand Professor Hudson devotes
so little space to the subject because it deals with matters unlikely to arise
in the average present day lawyer's practice and because of the improb-
ability that the next generation of lawyers will have any greater contact
with such matters.
It is difficult to disagree with two such distinguished scholars, but it
seems to the reviewer that the study of the law of war and neutrality has
a place in any introductory course in international law and should receive
considerable emphasis in such a course. In the first place public interna-
tional law is a highly specialized subject and few indeed are the students
who take the subject with any idea of using it in the practice of law. It
is also doubtful whether any appreciable number of students would pursue
an advanced course in the subject. In fact it is more probable that the
majority of law students who take international law do so for the purpose
of broadening their general legal knowledge. For this reason it would
seem desirable that an introductory course in international law devote
sufficient space and time to the law of war and neutrality to afford the one-
year student some basis for forming an intelligent opinion on matters re-
lating to war so much discussed in time of peace. War is not gone from
the earth, despite the Kellogg Pact, and when it comes the nation cannot
have too many men versed in the law of war and neutrality to serve as
leaders of public opinion. It must be noted here that Professor Hudson's
chapter on neutrality and neutral rights is far from satisfactory for the
purpose suggested. Particularly is this true of the subdivision on inter-
ference with neutral trade, a matter of decided importance to the American
student. With the exception of The Adula, all of the cases chosen arose
out of the World War, apparently upon the assumption that the British
Prize Courts' unilateral "development" of the law relating to neutral rights
has made obsolete all that some of us once thought was the law governing
the conduct of neutral trade; in. time of war. Lord Stowell is entirely
supplanted by Sir Samuel Evans; Garner is freely cited in the footnotes,
but nowhere is any reference found to the sage advice of John Bassett
Moore's International Law and Some Current Illusions.
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Space forbids any detailed comparison of these two books, but it may be
said in general that Hudson's book deals with a considerably larger num-
ber and variety of topics than does that of Dickinson. The latter usually,
though not always, treats the major subjects found in both works in greater
detail. For example, he devotes thirty-six pages to the important matter
of the relation of international law to municipal law, while Hudson rele-
gates it to a footnote. Hudson, on the other hand, devotes thirty-two
pages to consuls, while Dickinson disposes of the subject in five pages.
This is illustrative of Dickinson's concentration on matters which may
be deemed fundamental, and of Hudson's wider scope and greater regularity
of emphasis. For those who may be interested, it should be noted that
Professor Hudson devotes a chapter to "International Regulation of Com-
merce and Industry" as well as considerable space to the League of
Nations and World Court. In view of Professor Hudson's well known
enthusiasm for the League and all its associations, however, it must be caid
that he has shown commendable restraint in the amount of space allotted
to them.
In arrangement Hudson's book follows the general framework of Scott's
collection, with a fairly complete change of terminology and some shifting
of subheadings into chapter headings. The arrangement of Dickinson's
book seems preferable to this reviewer, though arrangement can be so.
readily modified to suit the needs of the individual instructor that it can
hardly be made the basis of criticism. Both volumes contain highly selec-
tive footnotes, but the notes in Hudson's book are less full than those in
Dickinson's, particularly as to non-case material
No opinion will be ventured upon the relative value of the two works.
Both represent much thought and labor and merit the cordial reception
they will doubtless receive from the profession. No man can edit a selec-
tion of cases acceptable to all his colleagues, and teachers of international
law will probably select the one or the other according to whether they
prefer Professor Dickinson's method of concentration on fundamentals, or
whether they desire, with Professor Hudson, to cover the larger field with
the resultant impossibility of concentration.
Mechanically the Hudson volume seems preferable. The index to Dick-
inson's book is highly inadequate and leaves much valuable material un-
noted. The wider margins of Hudson's book prevent the unwieldiness felt
in handling that of Dickinson. Hudson carries forward Scott's selected
library on international law considerably augmented but notably omits the
Recueil des Cours of the Hague Academy.
Houston, Texas JOHN P. BuLLINGroN.
The British Year Book of International Law. 1929. New York, Oxford
Uhiversity Press, 1929. pp. vi, 338. $6.
The tenth British Year Book of International Law contains, like the
previous iolumes in the series, many papers of interest and some of out-
standing merit. It includes, in addition, a much-needed index to the ten
volumes.
Dr. H. Lauterpacht makes an interesting examination of Decisions of
Municipal Courts as a Source of International Law. After indicating the
really large scope of decisions of municipal courts involving the principles
of international law, he considers the nature of the law applied in such
cases. "Can rules of international law administered by municipal tribu-
nals be regarded as international law proper," he asks, "or are. they in
fact rules of municipal law?" His failure to admit that, although in sub-
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stance the rules applied are the principles of international law, they are
at the same time, in a purely formal sense, administered by municipal
courts only as the law of the land, leads him into further difficulties.
He admits (p. 80) that the basis of international law is the consent of
states, and insists that consent to a particular rule may be implied from
a municipal decision of a country's courts as well as from a pronouncement
or act of its executive, but adds inconsistently (p. 85) that "when the de-
cisions in question originate from courts of a large number of states and
relate to a matter which lies within the particular province of these states,
they will create customary international law binding also upon such states
as had no occasion to signify their adherence to this rule." The paper
suffers from the belief held by its writer (and shared by many lawyers)
that the courts "make" law. As far as international law is concerned
the belief can be true in only a very limited sense, viz., that from the con-
cordant practice of the municipal courts of many individual states may
eventually arise a customary rule of international law. Even here it would
not be strictly true to say that any court has "made" international law.
Dr. Lauterpacht's paper is nevertheless extremely suggestive.
Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst contributes an enlightening commentary on Engelke
v. Musmann, treats of the real reason for granting diplomatic immunities,
'and discusses whether members of an arbitration tribunal should enjoy
a position of non-subjection to the local jurisdiction. Sir John Fischer
Williams makes an analysis of The Pan-American and League of Nations
Treaties of Arbitration and Conciliation and Professor Charles Cheney
Hyde writes on The Place of Commissions of Inquiry and Conciliation
Treaties in the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. Sir Skinner
Turner contributes from his experience as Judge of H. B. M. Supreme
Court for China on Extraterritoriality in China and Mr. George W. Kee-
ton analyzes very ably, though not perhaps without some bias, The Re-
vision Clause in Certain Chinese Treaties. Other papers include Inter-
national Law and the Property of Aliens, an answer by Mr. Alexander
Fachiri to a previous paper on that subject by Sir John Fischer Williams;
The Mandate for Palestine by Norman Bentwich; and International Re-
sponsibility of States for Judgments of Courts and Verdicts of Juries
amounting to a Denial of Justice by Professor James W. Garner.
Ithaca, N. Y. HEPBERT W. BRIGGS.
The Divorce and Separation of Aliens in France. By Lindell Theodore
Bates. New York, Columbia University Press, 1929. pp. 334.
This work is a manual upon the French law of divorce and separation
of aliens. Besides a bibliography, it contains thirty-four chapters, in which
are discussed all matters that may be of interest to English and American
lawyers wishing to advise clients with respect to a French divorce. The
author's efforts are mainly directed to an elucidation of the positive law
of France, not to a discussion of questions of a theoretical nature. The
work is of interest, however, not only to the class of persons for whom it
was primarily written, but to all desiring some familiarity with the law
and procedure of a civil law country, the subject of divorce being admirably
suited to bring out some of the fundamental differences existing between
Anglo-American and continental law in matters of practice and procedure
and in the conflict of laws. In addition, the French law presents peculiar
features of its own.
Of special interest to students of the conflict of laws are chapters IX
and XIII, entitled respectively, "Jurisdiction in Private International Law,"
and "Grounds in Private International Law." In the matter of jurisdic-
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tion the reader will discover that there is no statutory domicil or residence
requirement in France for purposes of divorce. We learn also that the
French courts are said to be incompetent on principle in suits between
aliens, but that jurisdiction may be taken, by way of exception, (1) if
it is so provided by treaty; (2) if the parties have a present bona fide
domicil in France; (3) if a refusal to take jurisdiction would be tanta-
mount to a denial of justice; (4) on grounds of public order, if the of-
fense occurred in France; (5) in case of voluntary submission to the jur-
isdiction of the court.
No divorce will be granted by the French courts unless the national
law of the parties recognizes divorce, and the petitioner is entitled to a
divorce under his national law and the lez fori. As regards citizens of
the United States domiciled in France, the French law becomes exclusively
applicable, on principles of renvoi, upon proof that the rules of the conflict
of laws of the United States would refer the question to French law.
As a manual of the French law of divorce and separation of aliens the
work deserves the highest praise. Not only is the information relating to
the French law and practice full and reliable, but it is presented in a
scholarly manner and a most readable style.
New Haven, Conn. ERNEST G. LoawzmiN.
Some Modern Tendencies in the Law. By Samuel Williston. New York,
Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1929. p. 167. $1.50.
Written with almost Einsteinian brevity this little series of University of
Virginia lectures metabolizes some of the more important trends of the
law in three short chapters. In its own reserved, original way it is a dis-
tinct addition to the Cardozo lecture contributions on the art of adjudication.
By illuminating examples drawn from his vast experience Williston gives
us a fresh perspective on some of the ever-present problems of the law.
His analysis of the query, what is law, indicates his wisdom by a refusal
to give an epigrammatic answer; the treatment of the relationship of law
and mores is worthy of Sumner; his subtle portrayal of the interplay
of precedent and the many other factors which influence judicial behavior
is masterful; the contrasting and evaluation of the comparative advantages
and disadvantages of unwritten law, codification, restatement, analytical
and sociological jurisprudence, the work of the teachers of law, and the
contributions of science to the law is indicative of an extraordinary mental
flexibility.
At times, however, his quest for certainty and predictability leads to
an over-emphasis of precedent and principles. For those of us who have
been more influenced by the repercussions of modern science and logic, the
technique of deciding cases from general principles is open to examination.
Often the judgment in a given case may involve the choice of one of several
competing principles. Dissenting opinions are in many instances pred-
icated upon this choice; and from the recent opposition to the Supreme
Court nominations it would seem that the public is not quite as convinced
as Williston that ours is a "government of laws and not of men."
It is gratifying to know that the creator of that trarauz d'archifecto, On
Cont'acts, is disproving the Osler dictum and is continuing to produce
objective evidence of his close and lucid thinking.
New York City OscAR Cox.
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Manual to United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports. By Charles A.
Roberts. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1929. Vol. I, pp. xviii, 1097.
A citator to the United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports has long
been needed. With the rapid increase in the number of those decisions
the need has become imperative. Since August 19, 1924, when the Board
heard its first case, to April 1, 1930, it has by decision or final order dis-
posed of approximately 30,000 cases, exactly 6,000 of them by written de-
cision and upon the merits. To this rapidly increasing store of income
and estate tax decisions by our most important tribunal of first instance
in such cases there has been no satisfactory key in the nature of a citator.
Roberts' Manual is the most ambitious attempt so far to meet that need.
The yolume now at hand covers the first eight of the existing eighteen
volumes of Board of Tax Appeals Reports. The second volume, the author
tells us, is in the process of compilation. The avowed chief purpose of
the Manual is to furnish an annotated citator which covers every signifi-
cant decision of the Board of Tax Appeals. The author has not annotated
in the ordinary sense of the word a large proportion of the cases, but in
Volume I he does, nevertheless, seem to cover every significant decision
in the first eight volumes of the official United States Board of Tax
Appeals Reports.
We find that there are 487 written decisions in Volume 1 of the official
United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports, 346 such decisions in Vol-
ume 5, and 275 in Volume 8. Many of those decisions cite no authorities,
are upon a peculiar state of facts of no interest beyond the individual
case, establish no principle of law, and quite obviously will never themselves
be cited. Mr. Roberts calls these "routine" decisions and in the interest
of space omits them from his Manual. For example, Mr. Roberts includes
in his Manual but 357 ol the 487 decisions in Volume 1 of the official
Board Reports, 290 of the 346 decisions in Volume 5, and 232 of the 275
decisions in Volume 8. With the author's exclusion of cases one can
scarcely quarrel. When in doubt about the importance of a decision or the
possibility of its subsequent citation the author has included it in his
Manual as a principal case. In this way he has included decisions of which
not less than five per cent are of much the same character as those he has
excluded.
Volume I of Roberts' Manual includes every Board of Tax Appeals de-
cision published in the first eight volumes of the official Board reports
which cites any earlier Board or Court decision and gives those citations.
It further includes every Board decision which is itself subsequently cited
in Volumes 1 to 16, inclusive, of the official Board Reports and in Federal
Court Reports and Internal Revenue Bulletins through 33 F. (2d), 279 U.
S., 49 Sup. Ct., 65 Court of Claims, and VIII Internal Revenue Bulletin No.
40, giving every such citation of each Board case. Obviously such a vol-
ume is of great utility to the student or the practitioner in the field of
income and estate tax law.
It would be a mistake to say that this Manual is a bare citator. It is
more than that. It gives in compact form a great deal of pertinent in-
formation about each case: the year of its decision, the date of death in
estate tax cases, the taxable periods in other cases, the citation of the
notice of acquiescence or non-acquiescence by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the official head note of each decision reproduced as reported in
United States Board of Tax Appeals Reports, a notice, where possible, of
affirmances, reversals and modifications, frequent cross-references to con-
nected and comparative decisions and to other cases and rulings deemed
worthy of note by the author, and occasionally editorial comment. Phrases
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of description or explanation of subsequent cases listed as citing a particu-
lar Board decision are the exception, however, not the rule. Editorial corn-
ment where given is often very good.
As a citator the book has one substantial defect. Where a Board case
is authority for more than one point the Alcuzal does not show upon which
of the points the case is cited in the subsequent decisions. Thus some
cases are shown as cited in as many as sixty, eighty-two and ninety-four
later Board and Court decisions at the time the Manual went to press,
but without any indication of the points for which they were cited. To
discover that the user must examine each case in the list.
According to the author's preface, Volume II of his Manual will con-
tinue the citator and cover the United States Board of Tax Appeals de
cisions in 9 B. T. A. and subsequent volumes. It will also bring Volume
I to date by giving all subsequent citations of Board decisions treated
therein. Further features will be: the Table of Cases, alphabetically listing
all significant Board and Federal Court decisions in income and estate tax
cases; the topical Index to Leading Cases; and the Court Decision Citators
covering all Federal Court cases cited in Board decisions. Such a volume
will round out Mr. Roberts' work. Volume I alone is very useful. With
Volume II added, Roberts' Manual will become well nigh indispensable to
the student or practitioner of income and estate tax law. The volume at
hand is an excellent example of the printer's art, and the handsome bind-
ing is sturdy enough to stand the wear of daily reference.
Washington, D. C. WAmRRN F. WA'rTL.
1930 Supplement to Federal Income Taxation. By Joseph J. Klein. New
York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1930. pp. xi, 311. $3.
This supplement to the very useful work of Dr. Klein has bcen prepared
with the same degree of thoroughness and accuracy as distinguishes the
basic text. It seems most unfortunate that any authoritative work on
income tax procedure and practice must necessarily be out of date almost
as soon as it is published. The author does his duty when he periodically
brings the work up to date by preparing a supplement that closely follows
the basic text. This Dr. Klein has done, and the many practitioners who
are using the original work advantageously will find the same need for
the 1930 Supplement. After saying this, one feels like adding the pious
hope that Dr. Klein may be induced to republish his text in biennial edi-
tions so that the busy practitioner may have one final authoritative work
to consult.
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